Policy and Decision Models Delft University of Technology

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The lecture is about analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. Even more solution concepts (for n-person cooperative games) are introduced here: Bargaining Sets, the Nucleolus and the Gately Point. These solution concepts are based on a view of the game as a process of bargaining about what coalitions to form. These theories are applied to parliamentary coalition formation, which includes a discussion of theories about (ideological) policy spaces.

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The lecture is about analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. Even more solution concepts (for n-person cooperative games) are introduced here: Bargaining Sets, the Nucleolus and the Gately Point. These solution concepts are based on a view of the game as a process of bargaining about what coalitions to form. These theories are applied to parliamentary coalition formation, which includes a discussion of theories about (ideological) policy spaces.

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The course is a survey of models for analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. This lecture adds several ways to analyze and interpret n-person cooperative games. The Core follows naturally from definitions of individual rationality and collective rationality. The Shapley Value follows naturally from a set of axioms about fairness. In addition to these solution concepts, a power index may help to quantify (relative) power in, for example, voting situations. The Shapley-Shubik Power Index and the Banzhaf Index are explained and contrasted in this lecture.

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The course is a survey of models for analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. This lecture adds several ways to analyze and interpret n-person cooperative games. The Core follows naturally from definitions of individual rationality and collective rationality. The Shapley Value follows naturally from a set of axioms about fairness. In addition to these solution concepts, a power index may help to quantify (relative) power in, for example, voting situations. The Shapley-Shubik Power Index and the Banzhaf Index are explained and contrasted in this module.

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The course is a survey of models for analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. Until now, all games were played between two rational agents. In this lecture, n-person games are introduced, which may have any number of players. Because the number of possible outcomes grows exponentially with every additional player, the focus moves away from choosing strategies, and towards identifying coalitions. This is called cooperative game theory, and includes a new way to represent a game: the Characteristic Function Form. New solution concepts are Imputations, Domination (again), and Stable Sets.

EPA2142. Master Engineering and Policy Analysis. The course is a survey of models for analyzing and supporting design and decision-making in multi-actor settings. It's all about games of negotiation or bargaining. A new solution concept, Nash arbitration, is introduced: if the players agree to have the outcome determined by an impartial arbitrator, how should he allocate the pay-offs? Other cooperative solutions are shortly discussed as well, and the broader context of Negotiation Analysis is presented in a guest lecture.