No one maintains that the Court has always and forever been originalist in its orientation. By any definition of "originalism," there is a vast body of case law that does not conform to it. How do and should modern originalists - and here one might specifically include lower-court judges who consider themselves originalist - handle this case law? Do non-originalist precedents count for nothing, no matter the expectations built upon them? If they count, how much do they count? Given the interconnectedness of the Constitution's provisions and structure, does it make sense to be "originalist" in some respects and some contexts but not others? Does originalism itself provide means to answer, or even address, these questions or does one necessarily have to step outside originalism to establish its relationship to precedent? Featuring: Prof. Tara Leigh Grove, Vinson & Elkins Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin School of Law Prof. Randy Kozel, Fritz Duda Family Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School Prof. Gary Lawson, William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University School of Law Prof. John O. McGinnis, George C. Dix Professor in Constitutional Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law Moderator: Hon. William H. Pryor Jr., United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Overflow: Chinese Room