by Dalton T. Fuss, a US Army Special Forces Officer, and Nakissa P. Jahanbani, a senior analyst at the Afghanistan War Commission, as a part of Project Proxies and Partners   This essay examines the shortcomings in U.S. strategies against the Wagner Group and Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It highlights two key issues: these groups' ability to operate in obscure regions with little scrutiny, and the U.S. government's poor coordination of its national assets. The authors argue that adversaries like Russia and Iran employ more cohesive approaches combining soft and hard power, while the U.S. struggles with a fragmented strategy. They call for improved inter-agency coordination, increased international awareness, and a multifaceted approach to counter these groups' influence in vulnerable regions.   The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government. The essay can be found on the Irregular Warfare Initiative's website. If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items. Subscribe to this podcast and leave us a review. Until next time,   Keep Warfare Irregular