Socrates continues telling Io about the divine power, this time using the analogy of bees spreading honey.

The alternative to Io having a techne is that he is possessed by a divine power. Socrates first uses the magnet analogy.

Io seems almost to challenge Socrates to tell him why he is exceptional as someone with a techne, in that he can talk well only about one practitioner of his techne, although Socrates' last example implies that Io does not have Homer's techne. The techne of poetry and the techne of rhapsody appear to be treated differently. All the technai in this inductive passage are treated incorrectly, as if complete knowledge of the techne includes complete knowledge concerning the practitioners of the...

Socrates appears to perform a normal sequence of induction, but things are not quite what they seem.

To exemplify the point that any techne deals with the whole of the field of that techne, Socrates refers to graphike techne, meaning here just painting. Socrates proceeds, however, to talk about the critic of one artist needing to be able to criticize all artists if indeed the techne pertains to the whole. Earlier, Io had said that he excelled as a critic of Homer, but not of other poets, so Socrates' analogy is accurate, although it does not prove the point about techne pertaining to the...

The rhapsode Io can judge of the poets both who speaks well and who speaks less well since he has the appropriate techne, but in the next breath Socrates determines that Io can't judge anyone, even Homer, since he lacks techne and episteme. Even more strangely, Io seems happy with this, and even treats Socrates as a sophos whom he is happy to listen to.

Socrates concludes from the examples with arithmetic and medicine that the one who has a techne in a subject is the one who may recognize the one speaking well in the subject and the ones speaking badly (later in the argument, worse = less well), so that Io himself turns out to be the one with techne who can judge that Homer speaks well while the other poets speak less well. Socrates finally uses the word kritēs (judge), but not about those who judge rhapsodes such as Io in competitions, but...

Socrates steers the conversation back to the subject matter by asking who will recognize who speaks well or badly in arithmetic and in medicine. The answer is that the one who has the techne (craft / art) of arithmetic or medicine is the one who will recognize both types of speaker. Why does Socrates not mention a judge (kritēs) explicitly, or the verb "to judge" (dikazō)? He is certainly referring to the function of a judge, and we may ask why a judge is necessary for the argument. Why does...

Socrates does dialectic "badly" (as usual), failing to compare and contrast clearly and concisely. He allows Io to revert to an aesthetic understanding of Homer more than once.

Socrates and Io are already talking at cross-purposes. Socrates appears to want to talk about the rhapsode's ability (as part of his techne) to understand the intent (dianoia) of a poet, while Io states that it is the hardest part of the techne to perfect the expression of the intents (dianoiai) of a poet. Io is motivated to present the poems as beautifully as possible, not as informatively as possible.

Socrates concentrates his supposed envy of rhapsodes on their ability to understand the poet. Apart from the verb "to understand", he also uses the noun "dianoia", which I translate as "intent" or "intention". Io understands Socrates to mean what he himself means by dianoia, the emotional thought to be expressed in any particular passage of a poem.

The dialogue Io is very short but still not well understood. All agree that Socrates is talking to a rhapsode. The conversation is simple but Plato's intent is not obvious.

We are finally in a position to uncover the underlying concept or idea of the dialogue which is dramatized as it is and as it appears to be (correctly, to a dialectical reader, and incorrectly to the Many) in every aspect of the dialogue. Just as in HIppias Minor and in Politeia, there are actually several paradigms dramatizing this idea in various stages of false appearance. The characters are deigmata of the various paradeigmata.

The deigmata (examples).

We look at the various characters in the dialogue, so consistent that they may be regarded as models: Meno, Socrates, Anytus (based on a character in Theognis), Gorgias, Meno's slave. They seem to have features in common, but we still cannot see the diagonal line, as it were, which will make everything fall into place.

This is the second part of the overview of the dialogue Meno. Once again, we see that nothing actually said should be taken as the words of Plato himself, and that the philosophy must be found in what is more consistent in the dialogue, namely the characters themselves.

This and the following podcast provide a brief summary of the dialogue Meno, emphasizing the lack of philosophical content in what is said. To put it another way, the philosophy of Plato is not to be found in the words spoken by the characters. We should start thinking about the characters of the dialogue, which is only possible through listening to what they say.

Before reaching conclusions regarding the dialogue Meno, I thought it would be helpful to provide an overview of the general structure of a Platonic dialogue (at least, of the ones I have analysed), with the aid of the examples of Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, and Hippias Major (to these may be added the overview of Politeia, aka Republic, in episode 75).

The end! Who would be the politikos who could make another person politikos?  If reasoning has led to the fourth option proposed by Socrates, is it not episteme, and if so, why should it be reexamined? Socrates leaves Meno with an outline of the dialectic method.

Socrates provides Meno with a new answer to the question asked by Meno at the beginning of the dialogue. Virtue comes to people through divine lot.

What is the significance of good politicians being called divine? Why does it matter that not only women but also Spartan men think this way? We find out that all through Socrates' unflattering portrayal of good politicians as people lacking sense, Anytus has been listening, and appears to be, according to Meno, upset. Is this at all important for our understanding of the philosophical import of the dialogue, or is it merely a nod to the historical fact that Anytus was one of the prosecutors...

Socrates continues his attempts to make Meno think even while leading up to his grand conclusion. Politicians don't understand what they are talking about. This is a given. However, Socrates is supposed to be demonstrating that they have true opinion as a guide to beneficial acts. This he emphatically does not do.