Thomas F. Remington, Goodrich C. White Professor of Political Science, Emory University. Traditional theories of separation of powers systems have tended to emphasize the likelihood of conflict between president and assembly when a president can use decrees and other unilateral executive powers to bypass the legislature in making policy. More recent treatments have argued that decree-making can represent a tacit delegation of power to a president by parochial legislators confronting collective dilemmas. Both patterns are evident in the Russian case, where, under the constitution, the president possesses exceptionally broad decree power. Analysis of the aggregate record of law-making and decree-making activity since 1993, together with a close examination of cases where both laws and decrees were used to deal with the same issues, suggests that presidents prefer to take the legislative path except when policy conflict with the legislature is severe or when exigency prompts immediate action. Even when the president calculates that he can get an acceptable law, he may use a decree to set a new policy reversion point and prod the assembly to act. Alternatively, a presidential decree may be used to thwart successful legislation.